By Abdulkader Assad
Competing Paths to Peace: Analyzing Libya’s Political Initiatives in 2025
Libya’s political scene has remained fractured for over a decade, with rival governments, competing institutions, and foreign interference complicating every attempt at national reconciliation. As 2025 unfolds, the urgency to break the deadlock and hold long-delayed elections has pushed several Libyan actors to announce new political initiatives. From Tripoli to Benghazi, and from the Presidential Council to the UN Mission, the year has already seen a flurry of proposals aimed at restoring legitimacy and rebuilding consensus. A few major initiatives were launched by key Libyan players—the two rival governments, the High Council of State, the Presidential Council—as well as the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
The GNU’s Political Initiative
Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and his Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli, continue to argue that the only path forward lies in holding elections based on an agreed constitutional framework. In January 2025, Dbeibah reiterated his call for a “civilian-led democratic transition,” promising to support any electoral effort based on the roadmap laid out by UNSMIL and the Libyan Electoral Commission. However, critics view his initiative as a political maneuver to extend his time in power, especially given the GNU’s continued refusal to hand over executive authority without elections.
The Eastern Government and House of Representatives
In Benghazi, the House of Representatives (HoR), along with its designated government—led by Osama Hammad—put forward a competing initiative. In February 2025, HoR Speaker Aqila Saleh announced a proposal to form a new unified government that could oversee the elections, arguing that the GNU had lost legitimacy. The initiative also included a call for the HCS to agree on a final constitutional basis within 60 days. Yet this move was criticized by western factions as a unilateral step that undermines national dialogue, especially in the absence of real guarantees for power-sharing.
High Council of State’s Stalled Mediation Efforts
The High Council of State (HCS), based in Tripoli, initially welcomed the HoR’s call for coordination but later expressed reservations over the mechanisms proposed. Throughout early 2025, the HCS has floated its own proposals, calling for a return to the 2021 Geneva roadmap and rejecting the idea of forming a new interim government. Internal divisions within the Council have further weakened its credibility, and its initiative has so far failed to bridge the gap with the HoR.
Presidential Council’s National Dialogue Proposal
Amid institutional paralysis, the Presidential Council has attempted to assert a more active role as a neutral convener. In March 2025, Mohamed Menfi launched a “National Dialogue Initiative” aimed at gathering representatives from all political factions, including civil society, for a series of consultative meetings across Libyan cities. The Council argues that elections cannot proceed without national consensus and reconciliation. While the initiative has received cautious international support, its success remains uncertain, especially given the lack of endorsement from the rival governments.
UNSMIL’s Renewed Push for Elections
UNSMIL, under Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily until his resignation earlier this year, laid the groundwork for a new roadmap that aims to bring all Libyan stakeholders into a unified electoral process. The mission has continued to hold technical meetings with the High National Elections Commission and has urged Libyan factions to agree on electoral laws before mid-2025. In March, the UN mission proposed a “Libyan-owned and UN-facilitated dialogue platform” to accelerate consensus. However, skepticism about UNSMIL’s neutrality and the lack of enforcement mechanisms have limited its influence.
Competing Timetables, Diverging Agendas
While all actors claim to support elections and a peaceful transition, their initiatives reveal deep divisions. The GNU clings to electoral legitimacy without delivering a clear roadmap. The HoR pushes for a new government under its control, while the HCS wavers between cooperation and obstruction. The Presidential Council’s attempt at inclusive dialogue is admirable but lacks enforcement power. UNSMIL’s mediation remains vital, but without real leverage, it risks being sidelined.
The overlapping initiatives reflect both a shared desire to exit the crisis and a fierce competition for control over the process. None of the proposals offer a clear mechanism to resolve key issues: the sequencing of elections, the eligibility of candidates, and the fate of existing institutions.
Libya in 2025 finds itself once again navigating a maze of political proposals without a unified national path. Each initiative reflects not only a vision for peace but also a bid for influence. Whether these efforts will culminate in consensus—or merely deepen the divide—depends on the ability of Libyan leaders to compromise, and on the international community’s capacity to support and pressure them at once. Until then, the country remains at a political crossroads, with its democratic future hanging in the balance.
