By Abdullah Alkabir, political writer and commentator
Conflict over the Central Bank of Libya
The front lines of the conflict have temporarily calmed down, except for the Central Bank front, as the struggle intensifies over control of the country’s resources, through control of the bank, which has recently lost its balance between the two conflicting blocs, the Agila/Haftar camp and the Tripoli authorities.
The Agila’ House of Representatives revoked its past decision to dismiss the current governor, Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir, and appoint Mohamed Al-Shukri instead. This revocation came immediately after the Presidential Council moved towards implementing the very decision, and HoR decided through its last statement to keep Al-Kabir in his position, then it retracted and declared that the statement was forged.
This situation reflects the state of conflict within the Agila HoR, and its division into multiple blocs, due to the decisive influence of the ruling armed authority in the East on the decisions of Agila’s HoR. The Central Bank front could reignite all political, military, security and media conflict fronts.
The Presidential Council (PC), which had long distanced itself from the circles of conflict, contenting itself with the role of a rational spectator seeking calm and extinguishing fires, no longer had the luxury of playing this comfortable role. Criticism, pressure, and flames of conflict prompted the Presidential Council to take action, so it issued the decision to establish the National Referendums and Polls Commission, which according to the decision, it will be mandated to holding national referendums and public opinion polls on various issues that concern the people.
The speed of the response by Agila and his HoR to the presidential decision reflects the state of existential threat that Agila and his HoR sensed. The PC decision implies withdrawing HNEC powers, and implementing it means returning to the people on important files such as the draft constitution. Therefore, Agila’s HoR announced the repeal of the Geneva Agreement, and restoring the powers of the Supreme Commander from the Presidential Council, and considered the term of the Government of National Unity has ended.
The rapid developments did not end there, as the Presidential Council hit back at the Eastern Front, dismissing the Governor of the Central Bank, and decided to reconstitute the bank’s Board of Directors.
These are the developments of a tumultuous week of actions and their repercussions, and statements and counter-statements from all parties to the conflict. In parallel, and in a less intense battle, the debate continued between the Head of the High Council of State (HCS) and his competitor, Khaled Al-Mishri, over the presidency of the HCS after the disagreement and controversy over the voting paper of one of the HCS members in the recent elections for HCS presidency.
All political disputes during the past months and years had only a minimal direct impact on the people’s livelihood, so people were not overwhelmed by all the political tensions and conflicts, but they were angry at the tax imposed on foreign exchange sales, because its impact was direct on livelihood affairs, so If the dispute over the leadership of the Central Bank is not resolved with the acceptance of all parties, and is kept away from these tensions, the conflict will slide sharply to dangerous levels.
The Agila and Haftar camp were betting on the current governor, Al-Siddiq Al-Kabir, to get at least half of the budget. If Al-Kabir is excluded and they have no role in choosing his successor, Haftar will take the initiative to shut oil production again, and if he obtains international support or even from his allies in the Arab region, he may initiate a new attack on the capital.
There are local and international calls for constraint and refraining from the language of escalation, but it is not clear whether or not these calls will be heeded. However, what is certain is that the country is ruled by gangs which do not possess even the minimum level of logic for managing the affairs of the state.
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Libya Observer
