By Abdulkader Assad
Is Libya Becoming a Pawn in Trump's Migration Bargain?

Has Libya become the latest pawn in the international chessboard of migration politics? That question resurfaced this week following a CNN report revealing that US President Donald Trump’s administration held talks with Libyan authorities to designate Libya as a so-called “safe third country”—a destination where asylum seekers apprehended at the US border could be deported.
The report further claims that the Trump administration also explored deporting immigrants with criminal records from inside the US to Libya and Rwanda as part of a broader strategy to ease pressure on the American asylum system.
Citing unnamed sources, CNN said the discussions included meetings between senior US State Department officials and Libyan representatives, including figures linked to Saddam Haftar, who visited Washington this week and whose father Khalifa Haftar lived for years in Virginia, not to mention his 2019 "orange light" from Trump's then advisor John Bolton to attack Tripoli and seize power.
But these revelations raise a series of urgent questions—chief among them: who in Libya authorized such discussions? Were they conducted with the knowledge and approval of a unified, legitimate government? Or were they the product of ad-hoc contacts amid the country’s ongoing political fragmentation?
Libya remains a deeply divided state, plagued by dual governments, competing security apparatuses, and parallel institutions. Against this backdrop, it is unclear whether any Libyan entity truly has the legal and political mandate to negotiate international agreements of this magnitude—especially those touching on national sovereignty and human rights obligations.
Moreover, according to UN and international reports, Libya continues to suffer from severe institutional weakness, particularly in the justice and human rights sectors. These shortcomings cast serious doubt on the country’s ability to offer the basic legal protections required under international standards for asylum seekers. Can such a state reasonably be called “safe”?
This isn’t the first time Libya has been floated as a solution to migration challenges originating far beyond its borders. In past years, European policymakers have proposed the idea of offshore processing centers or temporary migrant facilities in Libya—a suggestion that was categorically rejected by the Government of National Unity, including by Libya’s interior minister, who emphasized that Libya “will not become a buffer zone for the failures of others.”
And yet today, similar proposals seem to be back on the table—this time from across the Atlantic. What is perhaps most alarming is the lack of any official clarification or denial from the Libyan government regarding the CNN report. Such silence only fuels public suspicion and deepens the perception of non-transparent, unilateral decision-making by powerful actors operating behind closed doors.
Who, then, is making these decisions? And on what legal or political authority?
Meanwhile, in the United States, these plans are facing legal hurdles. A recent federal court ruling blocked the deportation of asylum seekers to third countries without formal notice or a legal right to challenge the transfer. That may complicate the practical implementation of such policies—at least for now.
But in Libya, the issue isn’t just about legality. It’s about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the right of the Libyan people to know whether their country is being positioned—again—as a receptacle for foreign policy experiments.
At a time when Libya desperately needs institutional consolidation, transparent governance, and public trust, the idea that secret migration deals could be struck without public debate is both reckless and politically dangerous.
Will Libyan officials respond with clarity? Or will this matter quietly join the long list of shadowy foreign arrangements made in Libya’s name—but without its people’s consent?
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Libya Observer