By Dr. Fathi Fadhli, writer and political analyst

Two projects are trying to control the political scene in Libya today.

The UN Support Mission in Libya represented in its outputs; the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Government of National Accord and ministers-designate...etc.

And the so-called Dignity Operation project with its political bodies, such as House of Representatives and the Interim Government.

Despite the fundamental divergence between the two projects, the UN project is "ostensibly" a civil project, while the Dignity Operation is a military one; both are associated with external threads in some way or another.

The Presidential Council, the High Council of State and the bodies emanating from them are the result of the UNSMIL, the Security Council or the international community, with the vagueness of this word, in collaboration with some Libyan personalities.

The Dignity Operation also acquires its existence, continuity and strength from regional and western powers, in cooperation with a group of Libyans.

It should be noted here that some look at the Dignity Operation as a temporary operation with specific and limited tasks, which ends with the accomplishment of its mission, while others view it as a strategic project that will abolish with the restoration of the military rule in Libya.

The principal interface between the two projects - then - is the external linkages, and this is the main reason of their failure and confusion in getting Libya out of its security, political and economic crisis.

Because of that engagement and outside obligations, the two projects have lost the power and freedom of decision-making, in addition to the flow of secondary files (relatively) imposed by the UNSMIL on the Libyan scene.

The whole point is that the Presidential council and the Dignity Operation, and their wings, cannot move, advance, initiate or make decisions without seeking media, political, military, and security support from the outside. The two projects are chained and lacked from free action in the most sensitive domestic issues. Therefore, they cannot enable Libya to emerge from its crisis. Instead, their presence and continuation in this way will further exacerbate the crisis at all economic, security and political levels.

Moreover, in the time being, the post-revolution phase is not appropriate for the two projects, but an internal national project will fit better, especially at this point where the stage has actually been hijacked and led to a new destination.

From a "post-revolution" period to a construction phase to a "coup d'état" to a phase of war, which increased the Presidential Council and Dignity's failure.

So the thing that is missing is an internal national program free of external ties that includes all Libyan political forces, civil and military, who are in support of a civil state and all its positives of state and legal institutions, freedom of opinion, political pluralism in addition to peaceful power-exchange and  the separation of power… etc.

And again, the project must include all Libyan political powers that agree on the establishment of a civil state without marginalizing, neglect or transgression of any particular category or group, whatever their intellectual, political, partisan, regional, tribal or ethnic affiliations, regardless of the stream they come from, including those from the other two projects as long as they accept the civil state.

It is fair to mention that a segment of members of Parliament, the High Council of State and members of the political and military bodies that are currently at the forefront of the political scene can be attracted to the national project.

There is no doubt that there will be many difficulties, barriers and hurdles that awaits the absent project or the internal national project.

The primary impediment is that national initiative parties do not work as a team, with the lack of serious cooperation or consultation in between them, each acts on his own.

Despite the convergence of the main goals that each share, the degree of convergence had reached a magnitude that could set a minimum ceiling for all parties.

The second obstacle is the fragmentation of military forces, revolutionaries or arms campaigners who believe in a civil state away from any form of external association.

This requires a move to bring those groups together- at least temporarily - under a lower ceiling of common objectives until the civil state is set.

The third obstacle is the supporters of the two previous projects "the Presidential Council and the Dignity," taking into consideration the difference between them, including the UNSMIL and its outputs, and supporters of the Dignity Operation, Egypt, the UAE and others.

The supporters of these trends will certainly disrupt the national alternative.

The fierce battle will be with those who measure and analyze every initiative from the perspective of how it will affect their positions, gains, ambitions or their parties, regions or tribes.

Most of those who are sensitive about any internal national projects free of external guidance fear for their seats, gains or interests that might be shaken if they support or join other alternatives. Those do not value the alternatives from the standpoint of its validity to the homeland; they are in fact the owners of the phrase "what's your backup plan?" So - again - will be a third obstacle.

The fourth constraint is the insistence of some initiators on a No Drop policy on any of their initiative's clauses.

The fifth constraint is the reluctance of national entrepreneurs to put their initiatives into effect. The practical side is missing.

Most of the national initiatives are based on the theoretical part (preparation of the initiative, diligence in its terms, presentation to others, consultation with the elites, announcement of the initiative, inviting people to join, circumvent, encourage, adopt, etc., then it ends up there with no practical steps to turn the theoretical aspect into deeds.

Initiatives, proposals or projects need institutions that could translate it into practice, then - and only then - we can ask people to adopt and join the initiatives and unite behind it.

Alternatives are available, but they need to be turned into reality.

On the other hand, it should not be understood that a project free from any external engagement means non-cooperation with the "international community" as states and institutions, especially where it is necessary to cooperate such as legitimate common interests, and mutual outreach to build solid relations of just economic and political relations.

Nor should it be understood that the establishment of military forces embracing those who believe in an internal national alternative means declaring war on other forces that support the two previous projects.

Joining the hands of political and military forces backing the national project aims at creating a balance and gaining a foothold in the political arena.

In addition, impediments should not be a source of frustration, hesitation or hopelessness, it is wise to anticipate, deal with and address them objectively. Barriers and difficulties are meant to be removed from the road, not to stop us from achieving our goals. Addressing odds and difficulties and dealing with them is from the nature of things.

Some may ask why shouldn't we be satisfied with the UNSMIL as long as it aims "in theory at least" to establish a civil state?

The differences between establishing our civil state with a national project without international auspices are the priorities.

The national project will put the crisis of the citizen and the homeland first. While the UNSMIL, the Security Council or the international community will have other priorities.

Unfortunately, the priorities of the international community will never ever be in the interest of Libya.

Indeed, it was the failure to adopt national priorities that led the country into this dark tunnel.

Priorities - then - do not just make a big difference, but a crucial one.

Therefore, all national forces of various categories and affiliations, which sensed the gravity of the crisis, should come together around a "minimum" of common objectives.

At least they should guarantee a civil state and anticipate the hurdles and deal with them to start with a firm will and without hesitation. (When thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in Allah).  The verse 159 from Surah Al Imran” 

These forces must translate their initiatives into action and impose their will on the ground, even with a simple modest start.

In doing so, we will ensure, with God willing, the establishment of a civil state and thus to eliminate the shadow of the military rule.

We will also secure attention to the priorities of the citizen and the nation, especially that the anti-military bloc has more than enough to achieve this and is in a stronger political and militarily position, in addition that it is much closer to the aspirations of the Libyans. God grants success. 

Disclaimer:  The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Libya Observer

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